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Abstract
In this paper we present an extremely general method for approximately solving a large
family of convex programs where the solution can be divided between different agents, subject to
joint differential privacy. This class includes multi-commodity flow problems, general allocation
problems, and multi-dimensional knapsack problems, among other examples. The accuracy of
our algorithm depends on the number of constraints that bind between individuals, but crucially,
is nearly independent of the number of primal variables and hence the number of agents who
make up the problem. As the number of agents in a problem grows, the error we introduce often
becomes negligible.
We also consider the setting where agents are strategic and have preferences over their part
of the solution. For any convex program in this class that maximizes social welfare, there is a
generic reduction that makes the corresponding optimization approximately dominant strategy
truthful by charging agents prices for resources as a function of the approximately optimal dual
variables, which are themselves computed under differential privacy. Our results substantially
expand the class of problems that are known to be solvable under both privacy and incentive
constraints.
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1 Introduction
One hot summer, a large electricity provider has a big problem: electricity demand is in danger of
rising above generation capacity. Rather than resorting to rolling brown-outs, however, the utility
has the ability to remotely modulate the air-conditioners of individual buildings. The utility hopes
that it can coordinate shut-offs so that nobody is ever uncomfortable—say, guaranteeing that every
apartment’s air conditioner runs during some 10 minute interval of every hour when someone is
home—while keeping peak electricity usage under control.
The utility’s scheduling problem can be modeled as a capacitated max-weight matching problem
with a minimum service constraint: we want to match apartments to 10-minute intervals of time
such that a) the usage is below the max power production capacity at all time, and b) every
apartment is matched to at least one interval in every hour in which it is occupied. However, there
is a privacy concern: the utility will now make decisions as a function of when customers report
they are at home, which is sensitive information. How can we solve this problem so that no coalition
of customers j 6= i can learn about the schedule of customer i?
There is also a question of incentives: customers may lie about when they are home if doing so
gives them better access to air-conditioning without requiring that they pay more. Can we solve
the scheduling problem while also producing electricity prices (on an interval by interval basis)
so that no customer has significant incentive to misreport their values? Since the prices will be
publicly available, they must also protect the privacy of the customer schedules.
Thinking more generally, we can imagine many other similar distributed, private optimization
problems:
• Privacy-preserving multi-commodity flow: Consider the problem of routing packets through a
network to minimize the total cost subject to edge capacities. Here, the private data of each
individual corresponds to her source-destination pair, which may be sensitive information.
We would like to solve this problem so that no coalition of other individuals j 6= i can learn
about the source/destination pair of agent i. We also want to produce a price per edge so that
no agent has significant incentive to misreport the valuations or source/destination pairs.
• Privacy-preserving multi-dimensional knapsack: Consider the problem of scheduling jobs on
a cluster that has constraints on various kinds of resources (CPU cycles, disk space, RAM,
GPU cycles, etc.). The jobs have different resource demands and values. We wants to schedule
the most valuable set of jobs subject to the resource constraints, without revealing potentially
sensitive information about any individual agent’s jobs to the other agents. We also want to
set prices for each resource so that no agent has a significant incentive to misreport the value
or resource demands of their jobs.
To solve these problems (and many others—see Section 4) in one stroke, we exploit a common
structure of these problems: they are linear programs (or more generally, convex programs) where
both the input data and the output are partitioned among the agents defining the problem. The
algorithms need to report to each agent her air conditioning schedule, or her route through the
network, or whether her job is scheduled on the cluster, but not the other agent’s portion of the
output. An appropriate notion of privacy in this setting is joint differential privacy [Kearns et al.,
2014].
Informally, joint differential privacy requires the joint distribution on the portion of the outputs
given to agents j 6= i to be insensitive to the portion of the input provided by agent i—the “combined
view” of the other agents should not reveal much about the remaining agent. In contrast, the
standard differential privacy guarantee requires the entire output must be insensitive to any agent’s
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input. Jointly differentially private algorithms are known for a few problem (e.g., vertex cover and
set cover [Gupta et al., 2010], synthetic data generation for data analysts who want privacy for
their queries [Dwork et al., 2012, Hsu et al., 2013], equilibrium computation in certain large games
[Kearns et al., 2014, Rogers and Roth, 2014, Cummings et al., 2014]), but these algorithms are
custom-designed for each problem, and do not easily generalize.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
Our main contribution is a general technique for solving a large family of convex optimization
problems under joint differential privacy. Concretely, consider any convex optimization problem
that can be written in the following linearly separable form:
maximize
x
∑n
i=1 v
(i)(x(i)) + v(0)(x(0))
subject to x(i) ∈ S(i) (for all i)∑n
i=1 c
(i)
j (x
(i)) + c
(0)
j (x
(0)) ≤ bj (for all j).
Here, x(i) denotes the variables that form agent i’s portion of the output, for i = 1, . . . , n. We also
allow data for a special “agent 0” to model auxiliary variables and constraints that don’t depend
on private data. The functions {v(i)}i in the objective are concave, while the constraint functions
{c(i)j }i,j are convex; both can depend on the private data of agent i. The compact and convex sets
S(i) model the feasible region for a single agent; they naturally depend on the private data.
There are two types of constraints in the above convex program. The first type of constraints
(x(i) ∈ S(i)) involve only the variables of a single agent (for example, the flow conservation con-
straints between an agent’s private source and destination in the multi-commodity flow problem).
These are the “easy” constraints from a privacy perspective—if these were the only kinds of con-
straints, then each agent could separately optimize her portion of the objective subject to these easy
constraints. This is trivially jointly differentially private: an agent’s output would be independent
of the other agents’ data.
The second type of constraints involve variables from different agents (for example, the capacity
constraints in multi-commodity flow, or resource constraints in multi-dimensional knapsack). These
constraints are the “hard” constraints from the perspective of privacy in the sense that they are the
ones that couple different agents and require that the problem be solved in a coordinated manner.
We give a general method for solving such problems so that we approximately optimize the
objective and approximately satisfy the coupling constraints, while exactly satisfying the personal
constraints, all subject to joint differential privacy:
Theorem (Informal, some important parameters missing). There is an ε-jointly differentially pri-
vate algorithm which can find a solution to linearly separable convex programs (1) exactly satisfying
the personal constraints, (2) obtaining objective value at least OPT− α, and (3) guaranteeing that
the sum violation over the k coupling constraints is at most:
α ≈ O˜
(
kσ
ε
)
where σ is a measure of the sensitivity of the convex program. For packing problems, we can also
guarantee no violation of the coupling constraints at a small additional cost in the objective. For a
broad class of problems, we can also round to integral solutions with little additional loss.
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Our technique is based on the dual decomposition method in distributed optimization.1 While
the original motivation for such techniques was to solve large optimization problems on distributed
networks of computers, distributed solvers are conceptually attractive from a privacy standpoint:
they give a way to solve problems in which data is distributed, while minimizing the amount of
communication necessary between players.
Specifically, we construct a “partial Lagrangian” by bringing the “hard” constraints into the
objective, while letting the “easy” constraints continue to constrain the primal feasible region.
Doing this leaves us with the following equivalent minimax problem:
minimize
λ≥0
maximize
x:x(i)∈S(i)
L(x, λ) :=∑i v(i)(x(i))−∑j λj (∑i c(i)j (xi)− bj) .
The partial Lagrangian can be viewed as the payoff of zero-sum game between the primal player
(the maximization player, controlling the x variables) and the dual player (the minimization player,
controlling the λ variables). Equilibrium strategies (x∗, λ∗) form the optimal primal and dual solu-
tions. Further, approximate equilibria correspond to approximately optimal primal-dual solution
pairs (in a sense we will make precise).
We then compute an approximate equilibrium of the above zero-sum game under joint differ-
ential privacy. Without privacy, there are a variety of methods to do this; we do the following:
Repeatedly simulate play of the game, letting one player (for us, the dual player) update his vari-
ables using a no-regret algorithm (for us, gradient descent), while letting the other player (for
us, the primal player) repeatedly best respond to his opponent’s actions. The time averaged play
of this simulation is known to converge quickly to an approximate minimax equilibrium of the
game [Freund and Schapire, 1996].
In our case, the best-response problem for the primal player has a particularly nice form.
Crucially, the form of the Lagrangian allows us to compute a primal best response by having each
of the n agents best respond individually, without coordination: Given the current dual variables
λ
(t)
j , agent i solves the problem
maximize
x(i)
v(i)(x(i))−∑j λ(t)j c(i)j (x(i))
subject to x(i) ∈ S(i),
which is an optimization problem that is independent of the private data of other players j 6= i.
The combination of these individual agent best responses forms a primal best response in the
optimization problem, and the time-averaged strategies of individual agents will form our near
optimal primal solution. Because the portion of the solution corresponding to agent i was generated
in a method that was independent of the private data of any other agent j 6= i (except through the
dual variables), the primal solution we compute will satisfy joint-differential privacy so long as the
sequence of plays computed by the dual player satisfies differential privacy.
All that remains is to give a privacy preserving implementation of the dual player’s updates.
To do this, we use relatively standard techniques to implement privacy preserving gradient descent,
by adding Gaussian noise to the gradient of the Lagrangian at each step.
Finally, consider the setting where the agents have preferences over their parts of the final
solution, and the objective of the convex program is to maximize the total value of all agents (social
welfare). We can guarantee asymptotic truthfulness at little additional cost to the approximation
factor, with only minor modifications to the algorithm. By taking our approximately optimal
primal/dual solution pair and making a small modification (losing a bit more in approximate
1See Boyd et al. [2011] for an overview of this and related techniques.
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feasibility), we can treat the dual variables as prices. Then, every agent is allocated her favorite
set of primal variables given her constraints and the prices.2
In general, this property would not be enough to guarantee truthfulness: while no agent would
prefer a different solution at the given prices, agents may be able to manipulate the prices to their
advantage (say, by lowering the price on the goods they want). However, in our case, the prices arise
from the dual variables, which are computed under differential privacy; agents can’t substantially
manipulate them. As we show, this makes truth telling an approximate dominant strategy for all
players. In the “large game” setting where the number of players n increases, the amount any
player can gain by deviating will tend to 0 if the constraints are also relaxed.
1.2 Related Work
Distributed optimization techniques date back to the 1950s, with the original goal of solving large
optimization problems with networks of computationally limited machines. The area is very rich
with mathematically elegant algorithms, many of which work well in practice. The method we
develop in this paper is based on a simple technique called dual decomposition. For a more com-
prehensive overview, the reader can consult the excellent survey by Boyd et al. [2011].
Differential privacy emerged from a series of papers [Dinur and Nissim, 2003, Blum et al., 2005,
Dwork et al., 2006], culminating in the definition given by Dwork et al. [2006]. This literature
is far too vast to summarize, but we refer the reader to Dwork and Roth [2014] for a textbook
introduction.
This paper fits into a line of work which seeks to solve problems (mostly, but not exclusively
optimization problems) which cannot be solved under the standard constraint of differential privacy,
but must be solved under a relaxation (termed joint differential privacy by Kearns et al. [2014])
that allows the portion of the solution given to agent i to be sensitive in agent i’s data. Our work is
most related to Hsu et al. [2014a], who give an algorithm for computing approximately max-weight
matchings under joint differential privacy. This algorithm implements an ascending price auction
using a deferred-acceptance-esque algorithm and also uses prices (which are the dual variables
in the matching problem) to coordinate the allocation. Hsu et al. [2014a] use techniques rather
specific to matchings, which do not generalize even to the k-demand allocation problem (when
agents have general preferences, rather than “gross substitute preferences”), and certainly not to
general convex optimization problems. In fact, simply solving the allocation problem beyond gross
substitutes valuations was stated as the main open problem by Hsu et al. [2014a]; our technique in
particular solves this problem as a special case. Our algorithm also gives approximate truthfulness,
unlike the one by Hsu et al. [2014a], which had to sacrifice approximate truthfulness to improve
the accuracy of their algorithm.
For related work in private optimization, Hsu et al. [2014b] consider how to solve various classes
of linear programs under (standard) differential privacy. Their work contains many negative results
because many natural linear programs cannot be solved under the standard constraint of differ-
ential privacy, while we give broadly positive results (under the looser notion of joint differential
privacy). Nissim et al. [2007] also consider some combinatorial optimization problems, also under
the standard constraint of differential privacy.
Our work is also related to the literature on solving private empirical risk minimization prob-
lems, which involves unconstrained convex minimization subject to the standard differential privacy
constraint [Chaudhuri et al., 2011, Jain et al., 2011, Kifer et al., 2012, Jain and Thakurta, 2014,
Bassily et al., 2014]. Many of these papers use privacy preserving variants of gradient descent (and
other optimization algorithms), which we use as part of our algorithm (for the dual player).
2The allocation and prices can also be seen as an Walrasian equilibrium [Gul and Stacchetti, 1999].
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The connection between differential privacy and approximate truthfulness was first made by
McSherry and Talwar [2007], and later extended in many papers (e.g., by Nissim et al. [2012] and
Chen et al. [2013]). Huang and Kannan [2012] showed a generic (and typically computationally
inefficient) method to make welfare maximization problems exactly truthful subject to (standard)
differential privacy. The method of Huang and Kannan [2012], and more generally any differentially
private algorithm, cannot solve most natural auction problems (in which each agent receives some
allocation) with non-trivial social welfare guarantees. In contrast, we show a generic method of
obtaining joint differential privacy and (approximate) truthfulness for any problem that can be
posed as a linearly separable convex program, which covers (the relaxations of) combinatorial
auctions as a special case. Our method is also efficient whenever the non-private version can be
solved efficiently.
The connection between joint differential privacy and truthfulness is more subtle than the con-
nection with standard differential privacy. In order for a jointly differentially private computation
to be approximately truthful, it must in some sense be computing an equilibrium of an underly-
ing game [Kearns et al., 2014, Rogers and Roth, 2014, Cummings et al., 2014]. In our case, this
corresponds to computing dual variables which serve as Walrasian-equilibrium like prices. This
also circumvents the criticisms of (standard) differential privacy as a solution concept, given by
Nissim et al. [2012], Xiao [2013]—under joint differential privacy, it is not the case that all strate-
gies are approximate dominant strategies, even though truthful reporting can be made so.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Differential Privacy Preliminaries
We represent the private data of an agent as an element from some data universe U . A database
D ∈ Un is a collection of private data from n agents. Two databases D,D′ are i-neighbors if they
differ only in their i-th index: that is, if Dj = D
′
j for all j 6= i. If two databases D and D′ are
i-neighbors for some i, we say they are neighboring databases. We will be interested in randomized
algorithms that take a databases as input, and output an element from some abstract range Q.
Definition 1 (Dwork et al. [2006]). A mechanism M : Un → Q is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for
every pair of neighboring databases D,D′ ∈ Un and for every subset of outputs S ⊆ Q,
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
For the class of problems we consider, elements in both the domain and the range of the
mechanism are partitioned into n components, one for each agent. In this setting, joint differential
privacy [Kearns et al., 2014] is a more natural constraint: For all i, the joint distribution on outputs
given to players j 6= i is differentially private in the input of agent i. Given a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn),
we write x−i = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) to denote the vector of length (n− 1) which contains all
coordinates of x except the i-th coordinate.
Definition 2 (Kearns et al. [2014]). A mechanism M : Un → Qn is (ε, δ)-jointly differentially
private if for every i, for every pair of i-neighbors D,D′ ∈ Un, and for every subset of outputs
S ⊆ Qn−1,
Pr[M(D)−i ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[M(D′)−i ∈ S] + δ.
Note that this is still a very strong privacy guarantee; the mechanism preserves the privacy of
any agent i against arbitrary coalitions of other agents. It only weakens the constraint of differential
privacy by allowing agent i’s output to depend arbitrarily on her own input.
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We rely on a basic but useful way of guaranteeing joint differential privacy—the billboard model.
Algorithms in the billboard model compute some differentially private signal (which can be viewed
as being visible on a public billboard); then each agent i’s output is computed as a function only
of this private signal and the private data of agent i. The following lemma shows that algorithms
operating in the billboard model satisfy joint differential privacy.
Lemma 1 (Hsu et al. [2014a], Rogers and Roth [2014]). SupposeM : Un → Q is (ε, δ)-differentially
private. Consider any set of functions fi : U × Q → Q′. Then the mechanism M′ that outputs to
each agent i: fi(Di,M(D)) is (ε, δ)-jointly differentially private.
We will also use the advanced composition theorem, which shows how our differential privacy
parameters degrade under adaptive composition of differentially private subroutines.
Lemma 2 (Dwork et al. [2010]). Let A : Un → QT be a T -fold adaptive composition of (ε, δ)
differentially private mechanisms. Then A satisfies (ε′, T δ + δ′)-differential privacy for
ε′ = ε
√
2T ln(1/δ′) + Tε(eε − 1).
In particular, for any ε ≤ 1, if A is a T -fold adaptive composition3 of (ε/√8T ln(1/δ′), δ)-
differentially private mechanisms, then A satisfies (ε, T δ + δ′)-differential privacy.
Another basic tool we need is the Gaussian Mechanism, which releases private perturbations
of vector valued functions f : Un → Rk by adding Gaussian noise with scale proportional to the ℓ2
sensitivity of the function f :
∆2(f) = max
neighboring D,D′∈Un
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖2.
Lemma 3 (Dwork et al. [2006] (see e.g. Dwork and Roth [2014] for a proof)). Let ε, δ ∈ (0, 1)
be arbitrary, f : Un → Rk be a function with ℓ2-sensitivity ∆2(f). Let c be a number such that
c2 ≥ 2 log(1.25/δ), then the Gaussian Mechanism (which outputs f(D) + Z where Z ∼ N (0, σ2)k
with σ ≥ c∆2(f)/ε) is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
2.2 Zero-Sum Games and No-Regret Dynamics
Consider a two-player zero-sum game with payoff function A : X×Y → R. The maximization player
selects an action x ∈ X , with the goal of maximizing A(x, y). Simultaneously, the minimization
player selects an action y ∈ Y with the goal of minimizing A(x, y).
We will consider games such that:
• for all x, y ∈ X × Y the payoff A(x, y) is bounded;
• X and Y are closed, compact, convex sets;
• fixing y ∈ Y, A(x, y) is a concave function in x; and
• fixing x ∈ X , A(x, y) is a convex function in y.
It is known that any such game has a value V : the maximization player has an action x∗ ∈
X such that A(x∗, y) ≥ V for all y ∈ Y, and the minimization player has action y∗ such that
A(x, y∗) ≤ V for all x ∈ X [Kneser, 1952]. We can define approximate minimax equilibria of such
games as follows:
3See Dwork et al. [2010] for a more detailed discussion of T -fold adaptive composition.
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Definition 3. Let α ≥ 0. A pair of strategies x ∈ X and y ∈ Y form an α-approximate minimax
equilibrium if
A(x, y) ≥ max
x′∈X
A(x′, y)− α ≥ V − α and A(x, y) ≤ min
y′∈Y
A(x, y′) + α ≤ V + α.
To compute an approximate minimax equilibrium, we will use the following T -round no-regret
dynamics: one player plays online gradient descent [Zinkevich, 2003] as an no-regret algorithm,
while the other player selects a best-response action in each round. We will let the min player be
the no-regret learner, who produces a sequence of actions {y1, . . . , yT } against max player’s best
responses {x1, . . . , xT }. For each t ∈ [T ],
yt+1 = ΠY [yt − η · ∇yA(xt, yt)] and xt = argmax
x
A(x, yt),
where ΠY is the Euclidean projection map onto the set Y: miny′ ‖y − y′‖2, η is the step size. In
the end, denote the minimization player’s regret as
Ry ≡ 1
T
T∑
t=1
A(xt, yt)− 1
T
min
y∈Y
T∑
t=1
A(xt, y).
Now consider the average actions for both players in this dynamics: x = 1T
∑T
t=1 xt and
y = 1T
∑T
t=1 yt. Freund and Schapire [1996] showed that the average plays form an approximate
equilibrium:
Theorem 1 (Freund and Schapire [1996]). (x, y) forms a Ry-approximate minimax equilibrium.
In order to construct the approximate equilibrium privately, we also develop a noisy and private
version of the online gradient descent algorithm. We defer details to Appendix A.
3 Private Dual Decomposition
Let’s consider the electricity scheduling problem, which will be our running example as we present
our algorithm. Suppose we have n agents, who need power for T intervals. Each interval is
subdivided into Q slots, and agents have different valuations v ∈ [0, 1] for different slots. There is
a maximum amount of electricity c available for each (interval, slot) pair. Finally, agents demand
some total amount of electricity dt ∈ [0, Q] during each interval, and at most dmax in total over all
intervals. The demand may be zero for some intervals, say, if the agent is not home. Translating
the description in the introduction, we have the following linear program:
maximize
n∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Q∑
q=1
v
(i)
tq x
(i)
tq
subject to
n∑
i=1
x
(i)
tq ≤ ctq (for t ∈ [T ], q ∈ [Q])
Q∑
q=1
x
(i)
tq ≥ d(i)t ,
Q∑
q=1
T∑
t=1
x
(i)
tq ≤ dmax, and x(i)tq ∈ [0, 1] (for i ∈ [n], t ∈ [T ], q ∈ [Q]) .
We consider each agent’s valuations v(i) and demands d(i) to be private. Agent i will receive
variables x(i), which indicate when she is getting electricity. With this in mind, notice that this
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LP has a particularly nice structure: the objective and first constraints are sums of terms that
(term by term) depend only a single agent’s data and variables, while the second constraints only
constrain a single agent’s data. This LP is an instance of what we call linearly separable convex
programs.
Definition 4. Let the data universe be U , and suppose there are n individuals. We map each
database D ∈ Un to a linearly separable convex optimization problem O, which consists of the
following data: for each agent i,
• a compact convex set S(i) ⊆ Rl,
• a concave objective function v(i) : S(i) → R,
• and k convex constraint functions c(i)j : S(i) → R (indexed by j = 1 . . . k);
all defined by Di. O also includes the following data, independent of D:
• a compact convex set S(0) ⊆ Rl,
• a concave objective function v(0) : S(0) → R,
• k convex constraint functions c(0)j : S(0) → R (indexed by j = 1 . . . k),
• and a vector b ∈ Rk.
The convex optimization problem is:
maximize
n∑
i=0
v(i)(x(i))
subject to
n∑
i=0
c
(i)
j (x
(i)) ≤ bj (for j = 1 . . . k)
x(i) ∈ S(i) (for i = 0 . . . n).
We call the set of all such optimization problems the class of problems associated to U or simply a
class of problems, if U is unimportant.
Intuitively, the variables, objective, and constraints indexed by i belong to agent i for i ∈
{1, . . . , n}. The constraints and variables for i = 0 are shared—it is sometimes useful to have
auxiliary variables in a convex program that do not correspond to any player’s part of the solution.
We call the first kind of constraints the coupling constraints, since they involve multiple agents’
variables and data. We call the second kind of constraints the personal constraints, since they only
involve a single agent’s variables and data. We write S = S(0) × · · · × S(n) for the portion of the
feasible region defined only by the personal constraints.
Electricity Example. The coupling constraints are the power supply constraints on each time
slot, and the personal constraints are the agent’s demand constraints for different intervals.
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3.1 Algorithm
To solve the convex program, we will work extensively with the Lagrangian:
L(x, λ) =
n∑
i=0
v(i)(x(i))−
k∑
j=1
λj
(
n∑
i=0
c
(i)
j (x
(i))− bj
)
.
For clarity of presentation, we will assume in the following that our optimization problems are
feasible and that the strong duality condition holds, i.e.,
max
x∈S
min
λ∈Rk+
L(x, λ) = min
λ∈Rk+
max
x∈S
L(x, λ).
If our problems are not even approximately feasible, this will be easy to detect, and the assumption
that strong duality holds is without loss of generality in our setting, since our goal is only to
approximately satisfy the coupling constraints.4
We will interpret the Lagrangian objective as the payoff function of a zero-sum game between
a primal player (controlling the x variables), and a dual player (controlling the λ variables). We
will privately construct an approximate equilibrium of this game by simulating repeated play of
the game. At each step, the primal player will best-respond to the dual player by finding x
maximizing the Lagrangian subject to the dual player’s λ. The dual player in turn will run a
no-regret algorithm to update the λ variables, using losses defined by the primal player’s choice
of x. By a standard result about repeated play (Theorem 1), the average of each player’s actions
converges to an approximate equilibrium.
We will first detail how to privately construct this approximate equilibrium. Then, we will
show that an approximate equilibrium is an approximately optimal primal-dual pair for the orig-
inal problem; in particular, the primal player’s point will be approximately feasible and optimal.
Throughout, let the problem be O = (S, v, c, b).
Remark. Before we begin, we want to clarify one point. We will sometimes say “Agent i plays
. . . ” or “Agent i solves . . . ”. These descriptions sound natural, but are slightly misleading: Our
algorithms will not be online or interactive in any sense, and all computation is done by our
algorithm, not by the agents. Agents will submit their private data, and will receive a single output.
Our algorithm will simulate the agent’s behavior, be it selecting actions to play, or solving smaller
optimization problems, or rounding.
Let’s start with the primal player’s best-response. Rewriting the Lagrangian and fixing λ, at
each round, the primal player plays
argmax
x∈S
L(x) =
n∑
i=0
v(i)(x(i))− k∑
j=1
λjc
(i)
j (x
(i))
+ k∑
j=1
λjbj, (1)
which can be computed by solving
x(i) ∈ BR(i) (O, {λj}) := argmax
x∈S(i)
v(i)(x)− k∑
j=1
λjc
(i)
j (x)

4Strong duality is guaranteed in particular by Slater’s condition [Slater, 1950]: there exists some point x ∈ S such
that for all j ∈ [k],
∑n
i=0 c
(i)
j (x) < bj . If this is not already the case, it can be guaranteed by simply relaxing our
constraints by a tiny amount. Since our solutions will already only approximately satisfy the coupling constraints,
this is without loss.
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independently for each agent i, and combining the solutions to let x := (x(1), . . . , x(n)).
For the dual player, we will use the online gradient descent algorithm due to Zinkevich [2003]
for a suitably chosen target set Λ, together with noise addition to guarantee differential privacy. At
each time step we feed in a perturbed version of the loss vector l ∈ Rk defined to be the gradient
of the Lagrangian with respect to λ:
lj :=
∂L
∂λj
=
n∑
i=0
c
(i)
j (x
(i))− bj.
To obtain privacy properties, we further add Gaussian noise the to above gradient and update the
dual variables according to the noisy gradients.
Putting everything together, our algorithm Private Dual Decomposition (PrivDude) presented
in Algorithm 1 solves linearly separable convex programs under joint differential privacy.
Algorithm 1 Joint Differentially Private Convex Solver: PrivDude(O, σ, τ, w, ε, δ, β)
Input: Convex problem O = (S, v, c, b) with n agents and k coupling constraints, gradient
sensitivity bounded by σ, a dual bound τ , width bounded by w, and privacy parameters ε >
0, δ ∈ (0, 1), confidence parameter β ∈ (0, 1).
Initialize:
λ
(1)
j := 0 for j ∈ [k], T := w2, ε′ :=
εσ√
8T ln(2/δ)
, δ′ :=
δ
2T
,
η :=
2τ
√
T
(
w + 1ε′ log
(
Tk
β
)) , Λ := {λ ∈ Rk+ | ‖λ‖∞ ≤ 2τ}.
for iteration t = 1 . . . T
for each agent i = 0 . . . n
Compute personal best response:
x
(i)
t := argmax
x∈S(i)
v(i)(x)−
k∑
j=1
λ
(t)
j c
(i)(x).
for each constraint j = 1 . . . k
Compute noisy gradient:
ℓ̂
(t)
j :=
(
n∑
i=0
c(i)(x
(i)
t )
)
− bj +N
(
0,
2σ2 log (1.25/δ′)
ε′2
)
,
Do gradient descent update:
λ(t+1) := ΠΛ
(
λ(t) + ηℓ̂(t)
)
.
Output: x(0) := 1T
∑T
t=1 x
(0)
t and λ :=
1
T
∑T
t=1 λ
(t) to everyone, x(i) := 1T
∑T
t=1 x
(i)
t to agents
i ∈ [n] .
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3.2 Privacy
Next, we establish the privacy properties of PrivDude. We will first argue that the dual variables λ
satisfy (standard) differential privacy, because the algorithm adds Gaussian noise to the gradients.
Then, we will argue that the primal solution satisfies joint differential privacy, because each agent’s
best-response depends only on her own private data and the dual variables.
First, we define neighboring convex problems.
Definition 5. Let D,D′ ∈ Un be two neighboring databases. We say the associated convex programs
O,O′ are neighboring problems.
By looking at how much the gradient lj may change in neighboring instances, we can determine
how much noise to add to ensure differential privacy.
Definition 6. A problem O has gradient sensitivity bounded by σ if
max
k∑
j=1
∣∣∣c(i)j (x(i))− c′(i)j (x′(i))∣∣∣2 ≤ σ2,
where the maximum is taken over agents i, dual variables {λj} ⊆ Rk+, neighboring problems O and
O′, and
x(i) ∈ BR(i) (O, {λj}) and x′(i) ∈ BR(i)
(O′, {λj}) .
Electricity Example. We can bound the gradient sensitivity of the electricity scheduling LP. By
changing her private data, an agent may change her demand vector by at most dmax in each of T
time slots. Since the coupling constraints are simply the total demand over all agents for each time
slot, the gradient sensitivity is at most σ = 2
√
dmax.
The gradient sensitivity σ is the key parameter for guaranteeing privacy. By definition, it is a
bound on the ℓ2 sensitivity of the gradient vector l. By Lemma 3, releasing the noisy vector l̂ by
adding independent Gaussian noise drawn from the distribution N (0, 2σ2 log(1.25/δ)/ε2) to each
coordinate satisfies (ε, δ)-(standard) differential privacy.
Thus, the following theorem shows privacy of the dual variables in PrivDude.
Theorem 2. Let ε > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1/2) be given. The sequence of dual variables λ(1), . . . , λ(T ) and the
public variables x
(0)
1 , . . . , x
(0)
T produced by PrivDude satisfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. By Lemma 3 and Lemma 2.
To show joint differential privacy of the primal variables, note that agent i’s best response
function BR(i)(O, {λj}) (defined in Equation (1)) is a function of i’s personal data and the current
dual variables λj , which satisfy standard differential privacy by Theorem 2. So, we can use the
billboard lemma (Lemma 1) to show the sequence of best-responses satisfies joint-differential privacy.
Theorem 3. Let ε > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1/2) be given. Releasing the sequence of private variables x(i)1 . . . x(i)T
to agent i satisfies (ε, δ)-joint differential privacy.
Proof. By Theorem 2 and Lemma 1.
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3.3 Accuracy
Now, let us turn to accuracy. We first argue that the exact equilibrium of the game in which we
restrict the dual player’s strategy space corresponds to an optimal primal-dual pair for the original
game. While the original game allows the dual variables to lie anywhere in Rk+, we need to restrict
the dual action space to a bounded subset Λ, in order to use gradient descent. We first show that
if Λ is a large enough set, restricting the dual player to play in Λ will not change the equilibrium
strategy and value of the game. We next show that PrivDude computes an approximate equilibrium
of the Lagrangian game. Finally, we show that the approximate equilibrium strategy of the primal
player must be an approximately feasible and optimal point of the original convex program.
For the first step, we observe that the optimal primal and dual solutions (x∗, λ∗) achieve the
value of the unrestricted game, which is the optimal objective value OPT of the original convex
program.
Lemma 4. Let (x∗, λ∗) achieve
argmax
λ∈Rk+
min
x∈S
L(x, λ).
Then,
• x∗ is a feasible solution to the original convex program, and
• L(x∗, λ∗) = OPT, the optimal objective value of the original convex program.
Proof. Follows directly from strong duality of the convex problem.
We now reason about the restricted game, in which the dual player plays in a subset Λ ⊆ Rk+.
We first define a key parameter for the accuracy analysis, which measures how much the objective
can be improved beyond OPT by infeasible solutions, as a function of how much the infeasible
solution violates the constraints.
Definition 7. Consider all instances O = (S, v, c, b) in a class of problems. We call τ > 0 a dual
bound for the class if for all δ ≥ 0, i, and x ∈ S such that
n∑
i=0
k∑
j=1
(
c
(i)
j (x
(i))− bj
)
+
≤ δ, we have
n∑
i=0
v(i)(x(i)) ≤ OPT(O) + τδ,
where OPT(O) is the optimum objective for O. (We will frequently elide O, and just say OPT
when the convex program is clear.)
Electricity Example. The coupling constraints are power supply constraints. Violating these
constraints by δ in total will increase the objective by at most δvmax ≤ δ, so τ = 1 is a dual bound
for this problem.
Intuitively, the dual bound indicates how much the objective can increase beyond the optimal
value by slightly violating the feasibility constraints. It will control how large the dual action space
must be, in order to discourage the primal player from playing an infeasible point at equilibrium.
More precisely, we can show that the game with dual actions restricted to Λ still has the optimal
and feasible point as the equilibrium strategy for the primal player, if Λ is large enough.
Lemma 5. Suppose τ is a dual bound for a class of convex optimization problems. Then if we
restrict the dual action space to be Λ = {λ ∈ Rk+ | ‖λ‖2 ≤ 2τ
√
k}, there is a dual strategy λ• ∈ Λ
such that (x∗, λ•) is an equilibrium of the restricted game.
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Proof. By strong duality, there exists (x∗, λ∗) an equilibrium of the Lagrangian game with value
OPT. Played against any strategy in Λ, x∗ gets value at least OPT since it is an optimal, feasible
solution of the convex program. We first show that restricting the dual player’s action set to Λ
leaves the value of the game at OPT.
Consider any other primal action x. If it doesn’t violate any coupling constraints, then the dual
player can set all dual variables to 0. Thus, x has payoff at most OPT in the worst case over all
dual player strategies in Λ.
On the other hand, suppose x violates some constraints:
δ :=
k∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=0
c
(i)
j (x
(i))− bj
)
+
> 0.
We can construct a dual player action λ′ ∈ Λ to give the primal player payoff strictly less than
OPT:
1. For constraints j where x violates the constraints
n∑
i=0
c
(i)
j (x
(i)) > bj ,
set λ′j = 2τ .
2. For constraints j where x satisfies the constraint:
n∑
i=0
c
(i)
j (x
(i)) ≤ bj ,
set λ′j = 0.
Note that λ′ is a valid dual action in the restricted game, since λ′ ∈ Λ. Now, let’s bound the payoff
L(x, λ′) by comparing it to L(x∗, λ∗). By assumption, the objective term increases by at most τδ.
While L(x∗, λ∗) has no penalty since all constraints are satisfied, L(x, λ′) has penalty 2τδ since
there is δ total constraint violation. Thus,
L(x, λ′) ≤ L(x∗, λ∗)− 2τδ + τδ < OPT.
Thus, any infeasible x gets payoff at most OPT in the worst case over dual strategies Λ. Since x∗
is a primal play achieving payoff OPT, the value of the game must be exactly OPT. In particular,
x∗ is a maxmin strategy.
Now, since the primal player and the dual player play in compact sets S,Λ, the minmax theorem
[Kneser, 1952] states that the restricted game has an equilibrium (x•, λ•). Thus, λ• ∈ Λ is a minmax
strategy, and (x∗, λ•) is the claimed equilibrium.
In the remainder, we will always work with the restricted game: the dual player will have action
set Λ = {λ ∈ Rk+ | ‖λ‖2 ≤ 2τ
√
k}. To show that PrivDude computes an approximate equilibrium,
we want to use the no-regret guarantee (Theorem 16). We define the second key parameter for
accuracy.
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Definition 8. Consider all problem instances O = (S, v, c, b) for a class of convex optimization
problems. The class has width bounded by w if
max
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=0
c
(i)
j (x
(i))− bj
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ w,
where the max is taken over all instances O, and coupling constraint j, and x ∈ S.
Electricity Example. The coupling constraints are of the form
n∑
i=1
x
(i)
tq ≤ ctq,
and the x variables lie in [0, dmax]. Let cmax = maxt,q ctq be the maximum capacity over all slots.
If we assume there are a large number of agents so ndmax ≫ cmax, then the width is bounded by
w = ndmax.
The width controls how fast online gradient descent converges. However, although the conver-
gence time depends polynomially on w, our accuracy bound depends only on log(w). Applying
Theorem 16 gives the following regret guarantee for the dual player.
Lemma 6. Suppose w is the width for a class of convex optimization problems. Then with prob-
ability at least 1 − β, running PrivDude for T = w2 iterations yields a sequence of dual plays
λ(1), . . . , λ(T ) ∈ Λ with regret Rp to any point in Λ, against the sequence of best responses x1, . . . , xT ,
where
Rp = O
(
kτσ log1/2(w/δ)
ε
log
wk
β
)
.
As above, σ is the gradient sensitivity and τ is the dual bound.
Proof. We add Gaussian noise with variance
2σ2 log (1.25T/δ)
ε′2
to each gradient, where
ε′ =
ε√
8kT log(1/δ)
.
Furthermore, the target space Λ has ℓ2 diameter 2τ
√
k. So by Theorem 16, the regret to the
sequence of unnoised best responses x1, . . . , xT is at most
Rp ≤ τ
√
k√
T
(
w + 4
√
π log(1.25T/δ)
log 2
σ
ε′
log
(
2Tk
β
))
≤ τ
√
k
(
1 +
20σ
√
8k
ε
log
(
2Tk
β
)
log1/2
(
T
δ
))
≤ 40
√
8kτσ
ε
log
(
2w2k
β
)
log1/2
(
w2
δ
)
= O
(
kτσ
ε
log
wk
β
log1/2
w
δ
)
as desired.
By applying Theorem 1, we immediately know that PrivDude computes an approximate equi-
librium.
Corollary 1. With probability at least 1 − β, the output (x, λ) of PrivDude is an Rp-approximate
equilibrium for
Rp = O
(
kτσ log1/2(w/δ)
ε
log
wk
β
)
.
Finally, we show that PrivDude generates an approximately feasible and optimal point. For
feasibility, the intuition is simple: since the dual player can decrease the Lagrangian value by
putting weight 2τ on every violated constraint, there can’t be too many violated constraints: x is
an approximate equilibrium strategy for the primal player, and hence achieves nearly OPT even
against a best response from the dual player.
Proving approximate optimality is similar. We think of the primal player as deriving payoff in
two ways: from the original objective, and from any over-satisfied constraints with positive dual
variable. The dual player can always set the dual variables for over-satisfied constraints to zero and
decrease the Lagrangian value. If the primal player derives large payoff from these over-satisfied
constraints, then the best response by the dual player will substantially reduce the payoff of the
primal player and lead to a contradiction with the approximate maxmin condition. More formally,
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Suppose a convex program O = (S, v, c, b) has width bounded by w and gradient
sensitivity bounded by σ, and dual bound τ . With probability at least 1 − β, PrivDude produces a
point x ∈ S such that:
• the total violation of coupling constraints is bounded by
k∑
j=1
n∑
i=0
(
c
(i)
j (x
(i))− bj
)
+
= O
(
kσ log1/2(w/δ)
ε
log
wk
β
)
, and
• the objective satisfies
n∑
i=0
v(i)(x(i)) ≥ OPT− α, for α = 2Rp = O
(
kτσ log1/2(w/δ)
ε
log
wk
β
)
.
Proof. By Lemma 6, PrivDude computes an Rp approximate equilibrium (x, λ) with
Rp = O
(
kτσ log1/2(w/δ)
ε
log
wk
β
)
,
with probability at least 1− β.
Let us consider first consider feasibility. Since S is convex and each best response lies in S,
x ∈ S. Suppose x violates the coupling constraints by
∆1 :=
k∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=0
c(i)(x(i))− bj
)
+
.
Define λ′ ∈ Λ as
λ′ =
{
2τ if
∑n
i=0 c
(i)(x(i)) > bj
0 otherwise.
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Let’s compare the payoff L(x, λ) to L(x, λ′). By the equilibrium property, we have
OPT−Rp ≤ L(x, λ) ≤ OPT+Rp
and
L(x, λ′) ≥ OPT− 2Rp. (2)
For L(x, λ′), since the dual bound is τ , we know
n∑
i=0
v(i)(x(i)) ≤ OPT+ τ∆1.
At the same time, the penalty is at least
k∑
j=1
λ′j
(
n∑
i=0
c
(i)
j (x
(i))− bj
)
≥ 2τ∆1.
So,
L(x, λ′) ≤ OPT− τ∆1
and by Equation (2),
∆1 ≤ 2Rp
τ
= O
(
kσ log1/2(w/δ)
ε
log
wk
β
)
as desired.
To show optimality, let the convex program have optimal objective OPT. Suppose x has
objective value:
n∑
i=0
v(i)(x(i)) = OPT− α.
and say the penalty against λ is
ρ =
k∑
j=1
λj
(
n∑
i=0
c
(i)
j (x
(i))− bj
)
for total Lagrangian value L(x, λ) = OPT − α − ρ. Consider the deviation of the dual variables
λ′ ∈ Λ:
λ′j =
{
0 if coupling constraint j loose
λj otherwise.
Then L(x, λ′) = OPT− α. But since (x, λ) is an Rp-approximate equilibrium,
L(x, λ′) ≥ OPT− 2Rp
so α ≤ 2Rp as desired.
Remark. We stress that Theorem 4 bounds the sum of the violations over all coupling constraints.
In Section 5, we discuss how to modify the solution to instead give a stronger bound on the maximum
violation over any coupling constraint at a small cost to the objective value.
Applying Theorem 4 to the electricity scheduling LP, we immediately have the following result.
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Corollary 2. With probability at least 1−β, PrivDude run on the electricity scheduling LP produces
an electricity schedule x that
• satisfies all demand constraints exactly,
• exceeds the power supply constraints by
O
(
QT
√
dmax log(ndmax/δ)
ε
log
ndmaxTQ
β
)
in total, over all time slots, and
• achieves welfare at least OPT− α for
α = O
(
QT
√
dmax log(ndmax/δ)
ε
log
ndmaxTQ
β
)
,
where OPT the optimal objective value.
4 Examples
In this section, we illustrate the general bounds for PrivDude by instantiating them on several ex-
ample problems. For each example, we present the problem description and the relevant parameters
(gradient sensitivity, dual bounds, and width), and then state the guarantee we get on the quality
of the solution produced by PrivDude.
Problems
Relevant
Parameters
Welfare / Cost
(OPT±)
Constraint
Violation
d-demand
Allocation
d: max bundle size;
k: # goods
O˜ (kd/ε) O˜ (kd/ε)
Multi-commodity
Flow
L: longest path;
m: # edges
O˜
(
m
√
L/ε
)
O˜
(
m
√
L/ε
)
Multi-dimensional
Knapsack
vi: value; {wij}: weights
k: # resources
O˜
(
k3/2maxi,j
vi
wij
/ε
)
O˜
(
k3/2/ε
)
Allocation with
shared resources
m: # projects; k: # resources
d: # resources a project needs
O˜
(
md3/2/ε
)
O˜
(
md3/2/ε
)
Aggregative Games
Equilibrium LP
k: dimension of aggregator;
γ: sensitivity of aggregator
N/A O˜
(
k3/2γ/ε
)
While some examples are combinatorial optimization problems, our instantiations of PrivDude
only produce fractional solutions. To simplify the presentation, we will not discuss rounding tech-
niques here. In Section 5.3, we present a extensions of PrivDude to privately round the fractional
solution with a small additional loss.
4.1 The d-Demand Allocation Problem
Consider a market with n agents, a collection of goods G of k different types, and let sj be the
supply of good j. We assume that the agents have d-demand valuations over bundles of goods,
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i.e., they demand bundles of size no more than d. Let B = {S ⊆ G | |S| ≤ d} denote the set
of all bundles with size no more than d. For each S ∈ B and i ∈ [n], we write v(i)(S) to denote
agent i’s valuation on S; we assume that v(i)(S) ∈ [0, 1]. We are interested in computing a welfare-
maximizing allocation:
maximize
n∑
i=1
∑
S∈B
v(i)(S) · x(i)(S)
subject to
n∑
i=1
∑
S∋j
x(i)(S) ≤ sj (for j ∈ [k])∑
S⊆B
x(i)(S) ≤ 1, x(i)(S) ≥ 0 (for i ∈ [n], S ∈ B).
The private data lies in agents’ valuations over the bundles, and two problem instances are neigh-
boring if they differ by any agent i’s valuations. Since each agent demands at most d items, the
gradient sensitivity σ is at most
√
2d, and the width is bounded by nd. Also, the problem has a
dual bound τ = 1, as each agent’s valuation is bounded by 1.
Corollary 3. With probability at least 1 − β, PrivDude(·,√2d, 1, nd, ε, δ, β) computes a fractional
allocation x such that the total supply violation is bounded by
α = O
(
kd log1/2(nd/δ)
ε
log
ndk
β
)
with welfare
n∑
i=1
∑
S⊆G
v(i)(S)·x(i)(S) ≥ OPT−τα = OPT−α.
Note that the average violation per good is O˜(d/ε). See Section 5 for a method that solves this
problem with no constraint violations, at a small cost to the objective.
Remark. Our result gives an affirmative answer to the open problem posed by Hsu et al. [2014a]:
can the allocation problem be solved privately for more general valuation functions beyond the class
of gross substitutes (GS)? Our welfare and supply violation bounds are incomparable with the ones
in their work, which assume GS valuations. For a detailed discussion, see Section 5.
Note that there are exponentially many primal variables (in d), but our error bound is in-
dependent of the number of variables. Moreover, we can implement PrivDude efficiently given
a demand oracle for each player, which, for any given item prices {λj}, returns a bundle B ∈
argmaxS∈B(v(i)(S)−
∑
j∈S λj) for each agent i.
4.2 Multi-Commodity Flow
While a broad class of combinatorial problems are instantiations of the d-demand allocation prob-
lem, some problems have special structure and more compact representations. For example, con-
sider the following multi-commodity flow problem over a network G(V,E). There are m edges and
n agents, and each agent needs to route 1 unit of flow from its source si to its destination ti. We
assume that for any agent i, any path from si to ti has length bounded by L. For each edge e ∈ E,
there is an associated cost c
(i)
e if an agent i uses that edge, and we assume that c
(i)
e ∈ [0, 1] for all
e and i. Also, each edge e has a capacity constraint : the amount of flow on edge e should be no
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more than qe. The problem can be written as the following LP:
minimize
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈E
c(i)e · x(i)e
subject to
n∑
i=1
x(i)e ≤ qe (for each e ∈ E)
x(i) forms a (si, ti)-flow (for each i ∈ [n]).
The private data lies in each agent’s costs on the edges and its source and destination. Since each
agent only routes 1 unit of flow, the gradient sensitivity of the problem is bounded by σ =
√
2L.
The problem has a dual bound τ = 1, and its width is bounded by n.
Corollary 4. With probability at least 1 − β, PrivDude(·,√2L, 1, n, ε, δ, β) computes a fractional
flow x such that the total capacity violation is bounded by
α = O
(
m
√
L log1/2(n/δ)
ε
log
nm
β
)
,
and the resulting fractional flow has total cost at most OPT+ ατ = OPT+ α.
Note again that this is the total violation summed over all edges. The average violation per
edge is smaller by a factor of m: O˜(
√
L/ε). See Section 5 for a method that solves this problem
with no constraint violations, at a small cost to the objective.
4.3 Multi-Dimensional Knapsack
In a multi-dimensional knapsack problem, there are a set of n items with values vi ∈ [0, 1] and
k different resources with capacities ci > 0. Each item i requires an amount wij ∈ [0, 1] of each
resource j. The goal is to select a subset of items to maximize the sum value while satisfying the
resource constraints:
maximize
n∑
i=1
∑
e∈E
vi · x(i)
subject to
n∑
i=1
wij x
(i) ≤ cj (for each j ∈ [k])
x(i) ∈ [0, 1] (for each i ∈ [n]).
Each agent’s private data consists of both the value of her job vi and its resource demands
{wij}. The gradient sensitivity is bounded by σ =
√
k, because each item can consume at most 1
unit of each resource. The problem has a dual bound τ = maxi,j
vi
wij
, and the width is bounded by
n.
Corollary 5. With probability at least 1 − β, PrivDude(·,√k, 1, n, ε, δ, β) computes a fractional
assignment such that the total violation in the resource constraints is bounded by
α = O
(
k
√
k log1/2(n/δ)
ε
log
nk
β
)
,
and has total profit at least
OPT− τα = OPT− α ·max
i,j
vi
wij
.
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4.4 Allocations with Shared Resources
We now give an example with auxiliary decision variables that are not associated with private
data. Suppose we have n agents, m projects, and k different resources. Each agent i has private
valuations {vij} over the projects. Each project requires a set of resources in Rj, but the resources
can be shared between different projects. A unit of resource r has cost cr, and for any project j
with ej enrolled agents, we require at least ej units of resources r for every r ∈ Rj. We also assume
that each project requires at most d distinct resources, and so the number of coupling constraints is
bounded bymd. We further assume that vij , cr ∈ [0, 1] for all i, j and r. Our goal is to match people
to projects so that the welfare of the agents minus the total cost of the resources is maximized, as
illustrated by the following linear program:
maximize
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
vij xij −
k∑
r=1
cr yr
subject to
n∑
i=1
xij ≤ yr (for j ∈ [k] and r ∈ Rj)
k∑
j=1
xij ≤ 1, xij ≥ 0 (for i ∈ [n], j ∈ [k]).
The private data lies in the valuations of the agents over the projects, and two problem instances
are neighboring if they only differ in some agent i’s preferences over the projects. To fit this problem
into our general framework, we interpret the variables {yr} as the “public” variables, controlled by
“agent 0”. The gradient sensitivity is bounded by σ =
√
2d. The problem has a dual bound τ = 1,
and the width of the problem is bounded by w = n.
Corollary 6. With probability at least 1 − β, PrivDude(·,√2d, 1, n, ε, δ, β) computes a fractional
allocation x such that the total resource violation (resource shortage across all projects) is bounded
by
α = O
(
md
√
d log1/2(n/δ)
ε
log
nmd
β
)
,
and the project matching along with the resource allocation gives welfare at least OPT − ατ =
OPT− α.
4.5 Equilibrium Computation in Aggregative Games
A recent paper by Cummings et al. [2014] showed that mixed strategy equilibria in aggregative
games5 can be computed using an algorithm that repeatedly solves a feasibility linear programs of
the following form:
n∑
i=1
m∑
ℓ=1
cjiℓ · xiℓ ≤ ŝ (for all j ∈ [k])
−
n∑
i=1
m∑
ℓ=1
cjiℓ · xiℓ ≤ −ŝ (for all j ∈ [k])
x(i) ∈ Bi (for all i ∈ [n]).
5They consider multi-dimensional aggregative games, a broad class of games that generalizes both anonymous
games and weighted congestion games. For more details, see Cummings et al. [2014].
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Each agent i controls the variables x(i) = (xi1, . . . , xim), which forms a probability distribution
over m actions. We assume that each coefficient in the coupling constraint is bounded by |cjiℓ| ≤ γ.
Note that we can add the objective minx 0 the LP without changing the problem, so it can be
framed as a linearly separable convex program. In particular, the gradient sensitivity is bounded
by
√
kγ. Since the objective function is a constant, any positive number is a dual bound for this
problem, so we could use τ = 1 as a dual bound. Also, the width is bounded by γn.
Corollary 7. With probability at least 1−β, PrivDude(·,√kγ, 1, γn, ε, δ, β) outputs a mixed strategy
profile that has total violation across all of the constraints bounded by
α = O
(
k
√
kγ log1/2(1/δ)
ε
log
nkγ
β
)
.
Remark. This leads to an improvement over the private LP solver in Cummings et al. [2014],
which gives a violation bound of O˜
(√
nγ√
ε
)
. Since n is large and k is a constant in their setting, our
violation bound is considerably better with no the polynomial dependence on n.
5 Variations on a Theme
When the convex program has additional structure, we can extend PrivDude to achieve additional
guarantees. In this section, we’ll discuss two extensions to PrivDude: deriving prices to achieve
approximate truthfulness, and guaranteeing exact feasibility.
5.1 Achieving Approximate Truthfulness
In the course of computing an approximate (primal) solution to the convex program, PrivDude also
computes an approximate dual solution, which has a standard interpretation as prices (e.g, see
Boyd and Vandenberghe [2004]). Informally, if we think of each constraint as modeling a finite re-
source that is divided between the variables, the dual variable for the constraint corresponds to how
much each variable should “pay” for using that resource. If each agent has a real-valued valuation
function for their portion of the solution, and the objective of the convex program is the sum of the
valuation functions (a social welfare objective), then we can make the prices interpretation precise:
Each agent’s solution will approximately maximize her valuation less the prices charged for using
each constraint, where the prices are the approximate dual solution produced by PrivDude.
Since the dual solution (and hence the final price vector) is computed under standard differential
privacy, we can also guarantee approximate truthfulness: an agent can’t substantially increase her
expected utility by misreporting her private data. Informally, this is because agents can only
influence the prices to a small degree, so since the algorithm is maximizing their utility function
subject to the final prices (which they have little influence on), agents are incentivized to report
their true utility. One technical difficulty is that since we are computing only an approximate primal
and dual solution, there may be a small number of agents who are not getting their approximately
utility maximizing allocation. For approximate truthfulness, we will modify their allocations to
assign them to their favorite solution at the dual prices. This may further violate some primal
constraints, but only by a small amount.
Let us first define the class of optimization problems we will solve truthfully.
Definition 9. Let the data universe be U , and suppose there are n individuals. A class of welfare
maximization problems is a class of convex programs O = (S, v, c, b) associated to U , with the
following additional properties:
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• Bounded welfare: v(i)(x(i)) ≤ V for all agents i and points x(i) ∈ S, for all feasible sets S for
agent i in the class.
• Bounded constraints: ∑kj=1 c(i)j (x(i)) ≤ C1 for all agents i points x(i) ∈ S, for all feasible sets
S for agent i in the class.
• Null action: for each agent i, there exists x(i) ∈ S(i) such that v(i)(x(i)) = c(i)j (x(i)) = 0 for
all constraints j. We call such a point a null action for i.
Now, we can define the personal data and utility function for each player. As is typical in the
literature, agents’ utilities will be quasilinear in money.
Definition 10. Recall that agent i has a compact feasible set S(i) ⊆ Rd, valuation function v(i) :
R
d → R, and constraint functions c(i)j : Rd → R. We assume that v(i)(x(i)) = 0 for any x(i) /∈ S(i).
An agent’s utility for solution x(i) and price p(i)(x(i)) ∈ R is v(i)(x(i))− p(i)(x(i)).
Our truthful modification to PrivDude will assign each constraint a price λj ∈ R, and charge
each agent i price
p(i)(x(i)) =
k∑
j=1
λjc
(i)
j (x
(i)),
where agent i’s solution is x(i). To guarantee truthfulness, we want every agent to have a solution
that is approximately maximizing her utility given the fixed prices on constraints. This motivates
the following definition:
Definition 11. Let α ≥ 0 and prices λ ∈ Rk be given. An agent i with solution x(i) is α-satisfied
with respect to these prices if
v(i)(x(i))−
k∑
j=1
λjc
(i)
j (x
(i)) ≥ max
x∈S(i)
v(i)(x)−
k∑
j=1
λjc
(i)
j (x)− α.
We are now ready to present our approximately truthful mechanism for welfare maximization.
The idea is to run PrivDude, obtaining solution x and approximate dual solution λ, which we take
to be the prices on constraints. For α to be specified later, we change the allocation for each agent i
who is not α-satisfied to a primal allocation x˜(i) that maximizes her utility at prices λ. Combining
x˜ with x for α-satisfied agents gives the final solution. We call this algorithm TrueDude, formally
described in Algorithm 2.
Let’s first show that the final allocation is approximately feasible, and approximately maximiz-
ing the objective (the social welfare). Both proofs follow by bounding the number of α-unsatisfied
agents, and arguing that since the intermediate solution (x, λ) is an approximate equilibrium (by
Corollary 1), changing the allocation of the unsatisfied agents will only degrade the feasibility and
optimality a bit more (beyond what is guaranteed by Theorem 4).
Lemma 7. Let α > 0 be given, and let (x, λ) be an Rp-approximate equilibrium of the Lagrangian
game. Then, the number of bidders who are not α-satisfied is at most Rp/α.
Proof. Note that the Lagrangian can be written as the sum of agent utilities plus a constant:
L(x, λ) =
n∑
i=0
v(i)(x(i))− k∑
j=1
λjc
(i)
j (x
(i))
 + k∑
j=1
λjbj =
n∑
i=0
u(i)(x(i), p(i)) +
k∑
j=1
λjbj,
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Algorithm 2 TrueDude(O, σ, τ, w, ε, δ, β)
Input: Welfare maximization problem O = (S, v, c, b) with n agents and k coupling constraints,
gradient sensitivity bounded by σ, a dual bound τ , width bounded by w, and privacy parameters
ε > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1/2), confidence parameter β ∈ (0, 1), and truthfulness parameter α.
Run PrivDude:
(x, λ) := PrivDude(O, σ, τ, w, ε, δ, β).
for each agent i = 0 . . . n:
Let the price of the solution be:
p(i)(x) :=
k∑
j=1
λjc
(i)
j (x).
if x(i) does not satisfy
v(i)(x(i))− p(i)(x(i)) ≥ max
x∈S(i)
v(i)(x)− p(i)(x)− α,
Set
x(i) := argmax
x∈S(i)
v(i)(x)− p(i)(x).
Output: x(i) and price p(i)(x(i)) to agents i ∈ [n].
so every α-unsatisfied agent that deviates to her favorite solution at prices λ increases the La-
grangian by at least α; suppose that there are m such bidders. Since (x, λ) is an Rp-approximate
equilibrium, we can bound the change in the Lagrangian by
αm ≤ L(x, λ)− L(x, λ) ≤ Rp.
So, at most m ≤ Rp/α agents can be α-unsatisfied.
This immediately gives us approximate feasibility and optimality for the output of TrueDude:
Corollary 8. Let β > 0. Running TrueDude on a welfare optimization problem O = (S, v, c, b)
with gradient sensitivity bounded by σ, a dual bound τ , and width bounded by w, produces a point
x such that all agents are α-satisfied, and with probability at least 1− β:
• the maximum violation of any constraint is at most Rp(2/τ + C1/α); and
• the welfare ∑ni=0 v(i)(x(i)) is at least OPT−Rp(2+V/α), where OPT is the optimal welfare.
As above,
Rp = O
(
kτσ log1/2(w/δ)
ε
log
wk
β
)
.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 4, since any unsatisfied agent changes the welfare by at most
V and has total contribution to all constraints at most C1, and by Lemma 7 there are at most
Rp/α unsatisfied agents.
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Additionally, TrueDude is approximately individually rational : no agent will have large negative
utility. More precisely:
Lemma 8. Suppose TrueDude compute solution x(i) and payment p(i)(x(i)) for agent i. Then,
v(i)(x(i))− p(i)(x(i)) ≥ −α.
Proof. The null action in agent i’s feasible region has utility equal to 0: the valuation is 0, and the
constraint functions are all 0, so the payment is 0. The claim follows, since
v(i)(x(i))− p(i)(x(i)) ≥ max
x∈S(i)
v(i)(x)− p(i)(x)− α.
Now, let us turn to showing approximate truthfulness. We now suppose that agents may
misreport their feasible set S(i) and valuation function v(i), but not their constraint functions c
(i)
j ;
we want to show that agents can’t gain much in expected utility by misreporting their inputs.6
More formally, we want to show approximate truthfulness. We will give a combined multiplica-
tive and additive guarantee:
Definition 12. Fix a class of welfare maximization problems. Consider a randomized function f
that takes in a convex optimization problem O = (S, v, c, b), and outputs a point x(i) ∈ S(i) and a
price p(i)(x(i)) ∈ R to each agent i. We say f is (ρ, γ)-approximately truthful if every agent i with
true feasible set S(i) and valuation function v(i) has expected utility satisfying
E
f(O′)
[
v(i)(x(i))− p(i)(x(i))
]
≤ ρ E
f(O)
[
v(i)(x(i))− p(i)(x(i))
]
+ γ,
where O = (S(i), S(−i), v(i), v(−i), c, b) is the problem when agent i truthfully reports, and O′ =
(S′(i), S(−i), v′(i), v(−i), c, b) is the problem when agent i deviates to any report S′(i), v′(i) in the class.
Remark. We note that the inequality must hold for any data from other agents S(−i), v(−i), not
necessarily their true data. Put another way, truthful reporting should be an approximate dominant
strategy (in expectation), not just an approximate Nash equilibrium.
We use a standard argument for achieving truthfulness via differential privacy. First, we show
that conditioning on the prices being fixed, an agent can’t gain much utility by changing her inputs;
this holds deterministically, since agents are getting their approximately utility maximizing solution
given the prices and their reported utility.
Lemma 9. Condition on TrueDude computing a fixed sequence of dual variables prices λ(1), . . . , λ(T ),
and let λ = (1/T )
∑T
t=1 λ
(t) be the final prices. Suppose an agent i has true feasible set S(i) and
valuation v(i). Let u(i)(S, v, {λ(t)}) be i’s utility (computed according to her true feasible set, valua-
tion, and final prices λ) for the output x(i) TrueDude computes when the sequence of dual variables
is {λ(t)} and i reports feasible set S and valuation v. Then,
u(i)(S′, v′, {λ(t)}) ≤ u(i)(S(i), v(i), {λ(t)}) + α
for every set S′ and valuation v′.
6More precisely, we can allow agents to misreport their constraint functions as long as the functions are verifiable:
they must feel their true contribution to the constraint (e.g., in terms of payments) when computing their utility.
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Proof. By Corollary 8, we know all agents are α-satisfied, so
u(i)(S(i), v(i), {λ(t)}) ≥ max
x∈S(i)
v(i)(x)−
k∑
j=1
λjc
(i)
j (x)− α.
Now, we claim that
max
x∈S(i)
v(i)(x)−
k∑
j=1
λjc
(i)
j (x) ≥ v(i)(x′)−
k∑
j=1
λjc
(i)
j (x
′)
for any x′. This is clear for x′ ∈ S(i). For x′ /∈ S(i), we know v(i)(x′) = 0 so the right hand side is
at most 0. Since there is a null action in S(i), the left hand side is at least 0, so the inequality is
true for x′ /∈ S(i).
In particular, letting x′ be i’s solution when reporting (S′, v′) against dual variables {λ(t)}, the
right hand side is precisely u(i)(S′, v′, {λ(t)}), and we have
u(i)(S(i), v(i), {λ(t)}) ≥ u(i)(S′, v′, {λ(t)})− α
as desired.
Now, we use differential privacy. Since the sequence of dual variables (and final dual prices) are
computed under standard differential privacy, any agent misreporting her input only has a limited
effect on the prices. More formally, we will use the following standard lemma about the expected
value of a differentially private mechanism.
Lemma 10 (McSherry and Talwar [2007]). Suppose we have a non-negative real valued mechanism
M : D → R+ that is (ε, δ)-differentially private, and suppose that the output is bounded byM(D) ≤
B for all inputs D ∈ D. Then, if D,D′ ∈ D are neighboring inputs,
E [M(D)] ≤ eεE [M(D′)]+ δB.
This is enough to argue that TrueDude is approximately truthful in expectation.
Theorem 5. Suppose we run TrueDude on a class of welfare optimization problems with a dual
bound τ . Then, TrueDude is (ρ, γ)-approximately truthful for
ρ = eε, γ = α(2eε − 1) + δmax{V,C1τ
√
k}.
Proof. Fix valuations and feasible sets of n − 1 agents, the constraint functions of all agents, and
consider a possibly deviating agent i. We first note that since the prices λ have norm ‖λ‖2 ≤ τ
√
k,
the maximum price charged is〈
c(i)(x), λ
〉
≤ ‖c(i)(x)‖2‖λ‖2 ≤ C1τ
√
k
by Cauchy-Schwarz. Since the valuation is at most V , the utility of agent i is bounded by
max{V,C1τ
√
k}. As above, let u(i)(S, v, {λ(t)}) be the true utility of agent i for the outcome
produced by TrueDude when reporting feasible set S and valuation v, against dual variables λ(t).
By approximate individual rationality (Lemma 8), u(i)(S, v, {λ(t)}) + α ≥ 0. By Lemma 9,
u(i)(S, v, {λ(t)}) ≤ u(i)(S(i), v(i), {λ(t)}) + α
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for every sequence of dual variables {λ(t)}. Let g(O) be the sequence of dual variables produced
by TrueDude on problem O. Noting that u(i)(S, v,−) is a deterministic function of the sequence of
dual variables, which are differentially private, Lemma 10 shows that
E
{λ(t)}∼g(O′)
[
u(i)(S′(i), v′(i), {λ(t)})
]
≤ E
{λ(t)}∼g(O)
[
u(i)(S(i), v(i), {λ(t)}) + α
]
≤ eε E
{λ(t)}∼g(O)
[
u(i)(S(i), v(i), {λ(t)}) + 2α
]
+ δmax{V,C1τ
√
k}
≤ eε E
{λ(t)}∼g(O)
[
u(i)(S(i), v(i), {λ(t)})
]
+ α(2eε − 1) + δmax{V,C1τ
√
k},
where O = (S(i), S(−i), v(i), v(−i), c, b) is the problem when agent i truthfully reports, and O′ =
(S′(i), S(−i), v′(i), v(−i), c, b) is the problem when agent i deviates to any report S′(i), v′(i) in the
class.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that TrueDude is private.
Theorem 6. TrueDude satisfies (ε, δ)-joint differential privacy.
Proof. By the privacy of PrivDude ( Theorems 2 and 3) and the billboard lemma (Lemma 1).
5.2 Adding exact feasibility
For the more restricted class of packing linear programs, not only can we achieve approximate
truthfulness, but we can also achieve exact feasibility. In fact, we can also round each agent’s
solution to a vertex in their feasible region Si (which is integral for many problems); this can lead
to more natural solutions for many problems (e.g., matchings and flows).
Let’s first define the linear programs we will consider.
Definition 13. A class of packing linear programs is a class of convex programs O = (S, v, c, b)
with the following additional properties:
• Objective functions are linear and bounded: 0 ≤ v(i)(x(i)) ≤ V for all x(i) ∈ S(i).
• Constraint functions are linear and bounded: 0 ≤ c(i)(x(i)) ≤ C∞ for all x(i) ∈ S(i).
• For each i, 0 ∈ S(i).
The parameters V,C∞ should hold for the whole class (i.e., they are independent of the private
data). To emphasize that the objective and constraints are linear, we will often write
〈
v(i), x(i)
〉
for
v(i)(x(i)), and likewise for c
(i)
j .
Our algorithm TightDude will first tighten the constraints, by reducing the scalars bj by an
amount ξ; we think of this step as “reserving some constraint”. Next, we will run PrivDude on
the reduced problem. Like TrueDude, we will let the final dual variables be the prices for the
constraints, and we will reassign agents who are very unsatisfied to their favorite good at the final
prices; this will guarantee approximate truthfulness. Finally, satisfied agents will round : they will
each select one of their best responses x
(i)
1 , . . . , x
(i)
T uniformly at random. Note that for packing
linear problems, each best response is a vertex of an agent’s private feasible region (if agents break
ties by selecting vertices). Since each agent’s favorite good at the prices is also a vertex of the
private feasible region, all agents will end up playing at a vertex. We will choose the amount ξ to
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Algorithm 3 TightDude(O, σ, τ, w, ε, δ, β)
Input: Packing linear program O = (S, v, c, b) with n agents and k coupling constraints, gradient
sensitivity bounded by σ, a dual bound τ , width bounded by w, and privacy parameters ε >
0, δ ∈ (0, 1/2), and confidence parameter β ∈ (0, 1).
Initialize:
ξ :=
√
3bj +
160
√
8kτσC∞
ε
log2
(
4w2k2
β
)
log1/2
(
2w
δ
)(
2
τ
+
C∞k
α
)
,
Ored := O with scalars bj − ξ.
Run PrivDude:
(x, λ) := PrivDude(Ored, σ, τ, w, ε/2, δ/2, β/2).
for each agent i = 0 . . . n:
Let the price of the solution be:
p(i)(x) :=
k∑
j=1
λjc
(i)
j (x).
if x(i) does not satisfy
v(i)(x(i))− p(i)(x(i)) ≥ max
x∈S(i)
v(i)(x)− p(i)(x)− α,
Set
x˜(i) := argmax
x∈S(i)
v(i)(x)− p(i)(x).
else
Select x˜(i) uniformly at random from best responses x
(i)
1 , . . . , x
(i)
T .
Output: x˜(i) and price p(i)(x(i)) to agents i ∈ [n].
cover the potential increase in each constraint from the unsatisfied agents and from the rounding,
thereby giving exact feasibility. We present the algorithm TightDude in Algorithm 3.
To analyze the welfare and the constraint violation, let OPTred be the optimal objective of the
reduced problem, and let κ = maxj ξ/bj be the largest fraction of constraint we are reducing. We
assume that the problem is feasible, so OPTred is defined and κ < 1. We can immediately lower
bound OPTred.
Lemma 11. OPTred ≥ (1− κ)OPT .
Proof. For any optimal solution x∗ of the original problem, (1 − κ)x∗ is a feasible solution of the
reduced problem with objective (1 − κ)OPT. The personal feasibility constraints aren’t violated
since 0 ∈ S(i).
We’ll first briefly argue approximate truthfulness; the argument for TrueDude carries over un-
changed. Note that the final output x˜(i) for any unsatisfied bidder is x(i) in expectation, while
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any unsatisfied bidder gets her favorite good at the final prices. Thus, truthfulness is clear by
Theorem 5.
Corollary 9. Suppose we run TightDude on a class of packing linear programs with a dual bound
τ . Then, TightDude is (ρ, γ)-approximately truthful for
ρ = eε, γ = α(2eε − 1) + δmax{V,Cτ
√
k}.
Next, let’s look at the welfare guarantee. We can bound the possible welfare loss from reassigning
unsatisfied bidders by the same argument form TrueDude, and we can use a standard Chernoff-
Hoeffding bound to bound the possible welfare loss from rounding.
Theorem 7 (see e.g., Dubhashi and Panconesi [2009]). Suppose X =
∑
iXi is a finite sum of of
independent, bounded random variables 0 ≤ Xi ≤M , and µL ≤ E[X] ≤ µH . Then, for any β > 0,
Pr
[
X > µH +
√
3MµM log(1/β)
]
≤ β and Pr
[
X < µL −
√
2MµL log(1/β)
]
≤ β
Theorem 8. Let β > 0 be given. Then with probability at least 1−β, TightDude run on a packing
linear program O = (S, v, c, b) with gradient sensitivity bounded by σ, a dual bound τ , and width
bounded by w has objective satisfying 〈v, x˜〉 ≥ OPT− α, for
α = O
(
κ ·OPT+
(
kτσ
ε
(
1 +
V
α
)
+
√
V ·OPT
)
log
(
wk
β
)
log1/2
(w
δ
))
,
for
κ = max
j
ξ/bj < 1,
so
min
j
bj ≫ ξ = Ω
(
‖b‖1/2∞ +
kτσC∞
ε
log2
(
wk
β
)
log1/2
(w
δ
)(1
τ
+
C∞k
α
))
.
Proof. Let x be the output from the (ε/2, δ/2)-private PrivDude on the reduced problem Ored. Note
that the objective 〈v, x˜〉 is the sum of i independent random variables, each bounded in [0, V ]. We
can lower bound the expected welfare with by Corollary 8; reassigning the unsatisfied bidders leads
to welfare at least
E [〈v, x˜〉] = 〈v, x〉 ≥ OPTred − 80
√
8kτσ
ε
log
(
4w2k
β
)
log1/2
(
2w2
δ
)(
2 +
V
α
)
.
with probability at least 1− β/2. Applying the concentration bound (Theorem 7), we have
〈v, x˜〉 > OPTred − 80
√
8kτσ
ε
log
(
4w2k
β
)
log1/2
(
2w2
δ
)(
2 +
V
α
)
−
√
2V ·OPTred log
(
2
β
)
≥ (1− κ)OPT− 80
√
8kτσ
ε
log
(
4w2k
β
)
log1/2
(
2w2
δ
)(
2 +
V
α
)
−
√
2V ·OPT log
(
2
β
)
= OPT−O
(
κ ·OPT+
(
kτσ
ε
(
1 +
V
α
)
+
√
V ·OPT
)
log
(
wk
β
)
log1/2
(w
δ
))
with probability at least 1− β/2, so everything holds with probability at least 1− β.
Finally, let’s look at the constraint violation.
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Theorem 9. Let β > 0 be given. Then with probability at least 1−β, TightDude run on a packing
linear program O = (S, v, c, b) with gradient sensitivity bounded by σ, a dual bound τ , and width
bounded by w has produces an exactly feasible solution as long as
κ = max
j
ξ/bj < 1,
so
min
j
bj ≫ ξ = Ω
(
‖b‖1/2∞ +
kτσC∞
ε
log2
(
wk
β
)
log1/2
(w
δ
)(1
τ
+
C∞k
α
))
.
Proof. Let x be the output from the (ε/2, δ/2)-private PrivDude on the reduced problem Ored.
For each constraint,note that the objective 〈cj , x˜〉 is the sum of i independent random variables,
each bounded in [0, C∞]. We can bound the expected left-hand side of each constraint for x˜ by
Corollary 8; reassigning the unsatisfied bidders makes the constraints at most
E [〈cj, x˜〉] = 〈cj , x〉 ≤ bj − ξ + 80
√
8kτσ
ε
log
(
4w2k2
β
)
log1/2
(
2w
δ
)(
2
τ
+
C∞k
α
)
with probability at least 1− β/2k, since the total amount any agent contributes to the constraints
is C1 = C∞k. Applying the concentration bound (Theorem 7), we have
〈cj, x˜〉 ≤ bj − ξ + 80
√
8kτσ
ε
log
(
4w2k2
β
)
log1/2
(
2w
δ
)(
2
τ
+
C∞k
α
)
+
√√√√3(bj − ξ + 80√8kτσ
ε
log
(
4w2k2
β
)
log1/2
(
2w
δ
)(
2
τ
+
C∞k
α
))
C∞ log
(
2k
β
)
≤ bj − ξ +
√
3bj +
160
√
8kτσC∞
ε
log2
(
4w2k2
β
)
log1/2
(
2w
δ
)(
2
τ
+
C∞k
α
)
≤ bj
with probability at least 1−β/2k, so taking a union bound over all k constraints, everything holds
with probability at least 1− β.
Remark. While we have presented TightDude as achieving approximate truthulness, we can also
run TightDude just for the rounding and exact feasibility by letting the truthfulness parameter α be
large; the welfare and constraint violation bounds degrade gracefully.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that TightDude is private.
Theorem 10. TightDude satisfies (ε, δ)-joint differential privacy.
Proof. By the privacy of PrivDude ( Theorems 2 and 3) and the billboard lemma (Lemma 1).
Comparison with Hsu et al. [2014a] In recent work, Hsu et al. [2014a] give an algorithm
for the d-demand allocation problem (a packing linear program) we considered in Section 4, but
assuming additionally the gross substitutes condition [Gul and Stacchetti, 1999] from the economics
literature on agent valuations. In this setting, Hsu et al. [2014a] give an (ε, 0)-joint differentially
private algorithm with the following welfare.
Theorem 11 (Hsu et al. [2014a]). There is an algorithm that on input a d-demand problem with
gross substitutes valuations and goods with supply s, with high probability finds a solution with
welfare at least
OPT− αn,
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and exactly meets the supply constraints, as long as
s = Ω˜
(
d3
α3ε
)
,
ignoring logarithmic factors, for any α > 0.
While we do not have algorithms specific to the gross substitutes case, we can consider the d-
demand problem (a packing linear program) with general valuations, rather than gross substitutes.
As discussed in Corollary 3, τ = 1 is a dual bound, σ = d
√
2 bounds the gradient sensitivity, and
w = n bounds the width. The maximum welfare for any agent is V = 1 and each agent contributes
at most C∞ = 1 towards any coupling constraint. While we can also achieve approximate truth-
fulness (unlike Hsu et al. [2014a]), we will take α to be large; this makes TightDude non-truthful.
Applying Theorem 8, we can lower bound the welfare of TightDude on a d-demand problem.
Corollary 10. With high probability, TightDude run on a d-demand problem with supply s for each
good finds a solution with welfare at least
OPT− O˜
((
1√
s
+
kd
sε
)
·OPT+ kd
ε
)
and exactly meets the supply constraints, as long as s = Ω˜(kd/ε), ignoring logarithmic factors.
Proof. Note that the max scalar ‖b‖∞ in the d-demand problem is simply supply for each item s.
The welfare theorem for TightDude (Theorem 8) holds as long as
min
j
bj = s = Ω˜
(√
s+
kσ
ε
)
.
As discussed in Section 4, the gradient sensitivity for the d-demand problem is bounded by σ = d
√
2.
So, we need s ≫ kd/ε. The welfare guarantee follows from Theorem 13, plugging in parameters
V = C∞ = 1 and noting that κ = O (1/
√
s+ kd/sε).
The two algorithms are somewhat incomparable, for several reasons:
• The welfare of TightDude (Corollary 11) depends on k (but not n), while the welfare guarantee
in Theorem 11 depends on n (but not k).
• The algorithm of Hsu et al. [2014a] requires the gross substitutes condition while TightDude
does not.
• The algorithm of Hsu et al. [2014a] satisfies pure (ε, 0)-joint differential privacy, while TightDude
satisfies (ε, δ)-joint differential privacy only for δ > 0.
Nevertheless, we can try to make a rough comparison. In the algorithm by Hsu et al. [2014a],
take α ≈ (d2/k)1/3, and say the supply s ≈ d3/α3ε ≈ kd/ε (the minimum needed for both Theo-
rem 11 and Corollary 11 to apply). Then by Corollary 10, TightDude gets welfare at least
(1− O˜(1)) ·OPT− O˜
(
kd
ε
)
versus OPT− αn ≈ OPT− n(d2/k)1/3. Thus, TightDude improves when n is large compared to k
and OPT:
n≫ k
4/3
dε
+
k1/3
d2/3
·OPT.
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5.3 Exact feasibility, take 2
If we don’t need approximate truthfulness, we can round and guarantee exact feasibility in a
different way, with an accuracy guarantee incomparable to Theorem 8. We will continue to work
with packing linear programs with a null action (Definition 13), assuming one more thing.
Assumption. We will consider classes of packing linear programs O = (S, v, c, b) with one extra
condition: Each S(i) is a polytope such that at each vertex x, for all j, c
(i)
j (x) = 0 or c
(i)
j (x) ≥ L > 0.
This parameter L is valid for the entire class; in particular, it does not depend on private data.
Our modification to the solution of PrivDude will work in two steps. Instead of tightening the
constraints like TightDude, we run PrivDude on the original linear program. Similar to TightDude,
each agent will then round her solution by selecting a uniformly random best response from her set
of best responses x
(i)
1 , . . . , x
(i)
T . To handle the constraint violation, we will maintain a differentially
private flag on each constraint, which is raised when the constraint goes tight. In order, we will
take agent i’s rounded solution if the flag is down for every constraint she contributes to, i.e., for
every j with
〈
c
(i)
j , x
(i)
〉
> 0. Otherwise, she goes unserved : we give her solution 0. The full code
is in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 RoundDude(O, σ, τ, w, ε, δ, β)
Input: Packing linear program O = (S, v, c, b) with n agents and k coupling constraints, gradient
sensitivity bounded by σ, a dual bound τ , width bounded by w, and privacy parameters ε >
0, δ ∈ (0, 1/2), and confidence parameter β ∈ (0, 1).
Initialize:
δ′ :=
δ
2
, ε′ :=
ε
2
√
8T ln(1/δ′)
, ζ :=
8(log n+ log(3k/β))
ε′
,
Tj := bj − ζ, Fj := Sparse(ε′, Tj) for j ∈ [k].
Run PrivDude:
(x, λ) := PrivDude(O, σ, τ, w, ε/2, δ/2, β/3).
for each agent i = 0 . . . n:
Select x˜(i) uniformly at random from best responses x
(i)
1 , . . . , x
(i)
T .
if Fj = ⊤ for some constraint with c(i)j (x˜(i)) > 0:
Set x̂(i) := 0.
else Set x̂(i) := x˜(i).
Query each sparse vector j with
q
(i)
j :=
n∑
l=0
c
(l)
j (x̂
(l)).
Output: x̂(i) to agents i ∈ [n].
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Let’s consider the first step. By almost the same analysis as for TightDude, we can show that
the rounding procedure degrades the objective and violates the constraints by only a small amount
(past what was guaranteed by Theorem 4).
Theorem 12. Let β > 0 be given. Suppose each agent i independently and uniformly at random
selects x˜(i) from x
(i)
1 , . . . , x
(i)
T . Then with probability at least 1− β,
• the objective satisfies 〈v, x˜〉 ≥ OPT− α, for
α = O
((
kτσ
ε
+
√
V ·OPT
)
log
(
wk
β
)
log1/2
(w
δ
))
;
and
• the total constraint violation is bounded by
k∑
j=1
(〈cj , x˜〉 − bj)+ = O
(√
kC∞‖b‖1 log
(
k
β
))
,
as long as
‖b‖1 = Ω
(
kσ
ε
log2
(
wk
β
)
log
(w
δ
)
max
{σ
ε
, 1
})
.
Proof. Let x be the output from the (ε/2, δ/2)-private PrivDude. Note that the objective 〈v, x˜〉 is
the sum of i independent random variables, each bounded in [0, V ]. By Theorem 4, we can lower
bound the expected objective:
E [〈v, x˜〉] = 〈v, x〉 ≥ OPT− 160
√
8kτσ
ε
log
(
4w2k
β
)2
log
(
2
δ
)
,
with probability at least 1− β/2. Applying the concentration bound (Theorem 7), we have
〈v, x˜〉 > OPT− 160
√
8kτσ
ε
log
(
4w2k
β
)2
log
(
2
δ
)
−
√
2V ·OPT log
(
2(k + 1)
β
)
= OPT−O
((
kτσ
ε
+
√
V ·OPT
)
log
(
wk
β
)
log1/2
(w
δ
))
with probability at least 1− β/2(k + 1).
For the constraints, define yj = (〈cjx〉 − bj)+ to be the constraint violation for j, if any. For
each constraint, we can bound the expected left-hand side of each constraint for x˜:
E [〈cj, x˜〉] = 〈cj , x〉 ≤ bj + yj .
Since 〈cj , x˜〉 is the sum of i independent random variables in [0, C∞], applying Theorem 7 gives:
〈cj , x˜〉 < bj + yj +
√
3(bj + yj)C∞ log
(
2(k + 1)
β
)
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with probability at least β/2(k + 1). So, the total constraint violation is bounded by
k∑
j=1
(〈cj , x˜〉 − bj)+ ≤
k∑
j=1
yj +
√
3(bj + yj)C∞ log
(
2(k + 1)
β
)
≤
 k∑
j=1
yj
+
√√√√√3kC∞ log(2(k + 1)
β
)‖b‖1 + k∑
j=1
yj
,
where the second step is by Jensen’s inequality. The sum of yj is the total constraint violation of
x, which is bounded by Theorem 4:
k∑
j=1
yj ≤ 160
√
8kσ
ε
log
(
4w2k
β
)
log1/2
(
2w
δ
)
≪ ‖b‖1,
where we have assumed that the constraint violation guarantees for PrivDude are non-trivial.7 Then,
k∑
j=1
(〈cj , x˜〉 − bj)+ ≤
160
√
8kσ
ε
log
(
4w2k
β
)
log1/2
(
2w
δ
)
+
√
6kC∞‖b‖1 log
(
2(k + 1)
β
)
= O
(√
kC∞‖b‖1 log
(
k
β
))
with probability at least 1− β/2(k + 1); the last step holds since we have assumed
kσ2
ε2
log2
(
wk
β
)
log
(w
δ
)
≪ ‖b‖1.
Taking a union bound over the k + 1 Chernoff bounds, everything holds with probability at least
1−β/2. Since PrivDude succeeds with probability 1−β/2, the total failure probability is 1−β.
Now, let’s consider the second step. To maintain the flags on each constraint, we will use k copies
of the sparse vector mechanism [Dwork et al., 2009]. This standard mechanism from differential
privacy takes a numeric threshold and a sequence of (possibly adaptively chosen) queries. Sparse
vector outputs ⊥ while the current query has answer substantially less than the threshold, and
outputs ⊤ and halts when the query has answer near or exceeding the threshold. The code is in
Algorithm 5.
Our queries will measure how large each constraint is for the users who have already submitted
their solution x(i), and the threshold will be slightly less than the constraint bound bj. We want to
argue two things: (a) sparse vector doesn’t halt while the constraint is at least α away from being
tight (for some α to be specified), and (b) each constraint ends up feasible. We will use a standard
accuracy result about the sparse vector mechanism.
Lemma 12 (see e.g., Dwork and Roth [2014] for a proof). Let α > 0, β ∈ (0, 1). Say sparse vector
on query sequence q1, . . . , qk and threshold T is (α, β)-accurate if with probability at least 1− β, it
outputs ⊥ while qi has value at most T − α, and halts on the first query with value greater than
T + α. Then, sparse vector with privacy parameter ε is (α, β)-accurate for
α =
8(log k + log(2/β))
ε
.
7If the constraint violation for PrivDude itself is already too big, then there is no hope for getting non-trivial
constraint violation for RoundDude.
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Algorithm 5 Sparse vector mechanism Sparse(ε, T )
Input: Privacy parameter ε > 0, threshold T , and stream of queries q1, q2, . . . .
Initialize: T̂ := T + Lap
(
2
ε
)
.
for each query qi:
Let y := qi + Lap
(
4
ε
)
.
if y ≥ T̂ :
Output ai = ⊤, Halt.
else
Output ai := ⊥.
Now, we are ready to show how much objective RoundDude loses in order to guarantee exact
feasibility.
Theorem 13. Let β ∈ (0, 1) be given. With probability at least 1−β, RoundDude run on a packing
linear program produces a solution exactly satisfying all the constraints, and with objective at least
OPT− α, for
α = O
(√
V log
(
k
β
)(√
OPT+
√
V
L
(
log n
ε
+
√
kC∞‖b‖1
)))
,
as long as
‖b‖1 = Ω
(
kσ
ε
log2
(
wk
β
)
log
(w
δ
)
max
{σ
ε
, 1
})
.
Proof. Let x̂ be the output. Since we make at most n queries to every flag, by Lemma 12 and
a union bound over all k flags, with probability at least 1 − β/3, the final left-hand side of each
constraint is at most
〈cj , x̂〉 ≤ Tj + 32
√
2(log n+ log(3k/β)
√
log(2/δ))
ε
= bj,
so x̂ is strictly feasible. Furthermore, each constraint with raised flag satisfies
〈cj , x̂〉 ≥ Tj − 32
√
2(log n+ log(3k/β)
√
log(2/δ))
ε
= bj − 2ζ.
Now, an agent is only unserved if she contributes to a violated constraint. Since the best-response
problem of each agent is to maximize a linear function over a polytope S(i), all best-responses
are vertices. So, an unserved agent contributes at least L > 0 to violated constraints, and each
unserved bidder reduces the total constraint violation by at least L.
By Theorem 12, with probability at least 1− 2β/3, the total constraint violation of x˜ is:
k∑
j=1
(〈cj , x˜〉 − bj)+ ≤ 3
√
kC∞‖b‖1 log
(
k
β
)
.
Now the final output x̂ has no constraint violation, and has reduced the right-hand side of each
constraint by at most 2ζ. So, the number of agents who are unserved is at most
U ≤ 1
L
(
2ζ ++3
√
kC∞‖b‖1 log
(
k
β
))
.
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Since each unserved agent contributes at most V to the objective, the final output x̂ reduces the
objective of x˜ by at most UV , so
〈v, x̂〉 ≥ OPT− 160
√
8kτσ
ε
log
(
6w2k
β
)
log1/2
(
2w
δ
)
−
√
2V ·OPT log
(
3(k + 1)
β
)
− V
L
(
64
√
2(log n+ log(3k/β)
√
log(2/δ))
ε
+ 3
√
kC∞‖b‖1 log
(
k
β
))
= OPT−O
(√
V log
(
k
β
)(√
OPT+
√
V
L
(
log n
ε
+
√
kC∞‖b‖1
)))
.
With probability at least 1 − β, sparse vector is accurate, the rounding succeeds, and PrivDude
succeeds.
To show privacy, we use a result about the privacy of sparse vector.
Theorem 14 (see e.g., Dwork and Roth [2014] for a proof). Let ε > 0. Sparse(ε, T ) is ε-
differentially private.
Privacy of RoundDude follows directly.
Theorem 15. Let ε > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1/2). Then, RoundDude satisfies (ε, δ)-joint differential privacy.
Proof. By Theorem 14 and Lemma 2, the flags are (ε/2, δ/2)-differentially private. Theorem 2
shows that the result of PrivDude is (ε/2, δ/2)-jointly differentially private. By the billboard lemma
(Lemma 1) and composition (Lemma 2), RoundDude is (ε, δ)-jointly differentially private.
Comparison with Hsu et al. [2014a] Like for TightDude, we can compare the welfare guar-
antee of RoundDude to the welfare guarantee of Hsu et al. [2014a] on the d-demand allocation
problem. As discussed there in Corollary 3, τ = 1 is a dual bound, σ = d
√
2 bounds the gradient
sensitivity, and w = n bounds the width. The maximum welfare for any agent is V = 1 and each
agent contributes at most C1 = 1 total towards all coupling constraints. Each agent’s feasible set
is simply the simplex {x : Rm | ∑mi=1 xi ≤ 1}, so the minimum non-zero coordinate at any vertex
is L = 1. Applying Theorem 13, we can lower bound the welfare of RoundDude on a d-demand
problem.
Corollary 11. With high probability, RoundDude run on a d-demand problem with supply s for
each good finds a solution with welfare at least
OPT− O˜
(
k
√
s
ε
)
and exactly meets the supply constraints, as long as s = Ω(d2/ε2), ignoring logarithmic factors.
Proof. Note that the sum of the scalars ‖b‖1 in the d-demand problem is simply the total number
of items sk. The welfare theorem for RoundDude (Theorem 13) holds as long as
sk = ‖b‖1 ≥ Ω˜
(
kσ
ε
max
{σ
ε
, 1
})
.
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As discussed in Section 4, the gradient sensitivity for the d-demand problem is bounded by σ = d
√
2.
So, we need s ≥ d2/ε2. The welfare guarantee follows from Theorem 13, plugging in parameters
V = L = C1 = 1 and noting that the maximum welfare OPT is at most the total number of goods
sk, so OPT ≤ ‖b‖1.
While the welfare guarantees are somewhat incomparable (see discussion for TightDude), we
can try to make a rough comparison. Take α ≈ (dε)1/3, and say the supply s ≈ d3/α3ε ≈ d2/ε2
(the minimum needed for both Theorem 11 and Corollary 11 to apply). Then by Corollary 11,
RoundDude gets welfare at least
OPT− O˜
(
kd
ε2
)
versus OPT− αn ≈ OPT− n(dε)1/3. Thus, RoundDude improves for larger n:
n≫ kd
2/3
ε7/3
.
Unlike TightDude, the welfare loss of RoundDude depend on OPT, but does degrade for larger s.
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A Private Online Linear Optimization
In this section we consider a private version of the online linear optimization problem. The tech-
niques we use to solve this problem are relatively standard (and are similar to solutions in e.g.
38
Kearns et al. [2014] and Bassily et al. [2014]), but we work in a somewhat different setting, so we
provide proofs here for completeness.
The learner has action set P ⊂ Rk, and the adversary has action space X ⊂ [−X,X]k . Given
any action p of the learner, and action x of the adversary, the (linear) loss function for the learner
is ℓ(p, x) = 〈p, x〉. For any sequence of T actions from the adversary {x1, . . . , xT }, the learner’s
goal is to minimize the regret defined as
RT = 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈pt, xt〉 −min
p∈P
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈p, xt〉.
For privacy reason, the learner only get to observe noisy and private versions of the adversary’s
actions. In particular, we can think of the loss vectors over T rounds as a (T × k)-dimensional
statistics x = (x1, . . . , xT ) some underlying sensitive population D. Suppose we add noise sampled
from the Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2) on every entry of x. We will determine the scale of σ in
the privacy analysis, and we will use the following concentration bound of Gaussian distribution.
Fact 1 (Gaussian Tails). Let Y be a random variable sampled from the distribution N (0, σ2) and
a = ln 2/(2π), then for all λ > 0
Pr[|Y | > λ] ≤ 2 exp (−aλ2/σ2) .
Fact 2 (Gaussian Sums). Let Y1, . . . , Yn be independent variables with distribution N (0, σ2). Let
Y =
∑
i Yi. Then, the random variable Y ∼ N (0, nσ2), and so
Pr[|Y | > λ] ≤ 2 exp (−aλ2/(nσ2)) .
Let {x̂t} be the noisy loss vectors. The learner will update the action pt using projected gradient
descent
pt+1 = ΠP [pt − ηx̂t] ,
where ΠP is the Euclidean projection map onto the set P: minp′ ‖p− p′‖2, η is the step size.
Before we show the regret bound for our noisy gradient descent, we here include the no-regret
result for standard online gradient descent (with no noise).
Lemma 13 ([Zinkevich, 2003]). For any actions and losses space P and X , the gradient descent
algorithm: pt+1 = ΠP [pt − ηxt] has regret
RT ≤ ‖P‖
2
2ηT
+
η‖X‖2
2
.
We are now ready to show the following regret bound for this noisy gradient descent.
Theorem 16. Let ‖P‖ = maxp∈P ‖p‖ and ‖X‖2 = maxx∈X ‖x‖2, then with probability at least
1− β,
RT = O
(
‖P‖2
√
k√
T
(
X + σ log
(
Tk
β
)))
.
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Proof. Let νt denote the noise vector we have in round t, we can decompose the regret into several
parts
RT = 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈pt, xt〉 − 1
T
min
p∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p, xt〉
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈pt, x̂t〉 − 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈pt, νt〉 − 1
T
[
min
p∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p, xt〉 −min
p̂∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p̂, x̂t〉
]
− 1
T
min
p̂∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p̂, x̂t〉
=
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈pt, x̂t〉 − 1
T
min
p̂∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p̂, x̂t〉
]
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈pt, νt〉 − 1
T
[
min
p∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p, xt〉 −min
p̂∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p̂, x̂t〉
]
= R̂T − 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈pt, νt〉 − 1
T
[
min
p∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p, xt〉 −min
p̂∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p̂, x̂t〉
]
≤ R̂T − 1
T
min
p∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p, νt〉 − 1
T
[
min
p∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p, xt〉 −min
p̂∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p̂, x̂t〉
]
.
We will bound the three terms separately. By the no-regret guarantee of online gradient descent
in Lemma 13, we have the following the regret guarantee w.r.t the noisy losses if we set η = ‖P‖√
T‖X̂‖
R̂T = 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈pt, x̂t〉 −min
p∈P
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈p, x̂t〉 ≤ ‖P‖
2
2ηT
+
η‖X̂ ‖2
2
=
‖P‖‖X̂ ‖√
T
,
where ‖P‖ and ‖X̂ ‖ denote the bound on the ℓ2 norm of the vectors {pt} and {x̂t} respectively.
Recall that for any random variable Y sampled from the Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2), we
know from Fact 1
Pr[|Y | ≥ d · σ] ≤ 2 exp(−ad2).
For each noise vector νt and any coordinate i, we have with probability except β/Tk that |νt(i)| ≤
σ
√
1
a · log
(
2Tk
β
)
. By union bound, we have with probability except β that
max
t
max
i
|νt(i)| ≤ σ
√
1
a
· log
(
2Tk
β
)
and so for all t, ‖νt‖2 ≤ σ
√
k
a
· log
(
2Tk
β
)
Since x̂t = xt + νt, we know that
‖X̂ ‖ ≤
√
k
(
X + σ
√
1
a
· log
(
2Tk
β
))
.
Now we bound the second and third term. From Fact 2, we know with probability at least
1− β/k, for each coordinate i,
∑
t
νt(i) ≤ σ
√
T
a
· log
(
2k
β
)
.
By a union bound, we know with probability at least 1− β∥∥∥∥∥∑
t
νt/T
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤
√
σ2
a log(k/β)√
T
and so
∥∥∥∥∥∑
t
νt/T
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
√
kσ2
a log(k/β)√
T
.
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Now we could use Holder’s inequality to bound the second term
− 1
T
min
p∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p, νt〉 ≤
∣∣∣∣∣minp∈P 〈p,
T∑
t=1
νt/T 〉
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖P‖
√
kσ2 log(k/β)√
aT
.
Let p∗ ∈ argminp∈P
∑T
t=1〈p, xt〉 and p̂∗ ∈ argminp̂∈P
∑T
t=1〈p̂, x̂t〉. We can rewrite the third
term as
− 1
T
[
min
p∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p, xt〉 −min
p∈P
T∑
t=1
〈p̂, x̂t〉
]
= −〈p∗,
∑
t
xt/T 〉+ 〈p̂∗,
∑
t
x̂t/T 〉
= −〈p∗,
∑
t
x̂t/T 〉+ 〈p̂∗,
∑
t
x̂t/T 〉 −
〈
p∗,
1
T
(∑
t
xt −
∑
t
x̂t
)〉
(Holder’s inequality) ≤ 〈p∗, 1
T
∑
t
(νt)〉 ≤ ‖P‖
√
kσ2 log(k/β)√
aT
.
In the end, we have that
RT ≤ ‖P‖
√
k√
T
((
X + σ
√
1
a
· log
(
2Tk
β
))
+ 2
√
σ2 log(k/β)√
a
)
≤ ‖P‖
√
k√
T
(
X + 2σ
√
1
a
· log
(
2Tk
β
))
=
‖P‖√k√
T
(
X +
(√
8π
log 2
)
σ
√
log
(
2Tk
β
))
= O
(
‖P‖√k√
T
(
X + σ log
(
Tk
β
)))
.
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